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Article

The Financial Crisis of 2008–2009:
Capitalism Didn’t Fail, but the Metaphors
Got a “C”
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw†
INTRODUCTION
This panel’s topic within the symposium on the financial
meltdown of 2008–2009 is the deliciously broad question: “Did
capitalism fail?” I have taken it as an invitation to ponder not
the merits and demerits of modern global financial systems,
but instead to continue my assessment of how those of us who
are not financial professionals might make sense of them, particularly when they are in catastrophic mode.1 My thesis is that
the question itself reveals the extent to which the financial crisis has not been so much about whether an economic system
succeeds or fails (as Judge Richard Posner has tried to assess
† Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School. A.B. University of
Michigan; J.D. Stanford University. Thanks to Eric Blumenson, Alan Childress, Robert Miller, Usha Rodrigues, Michelle Harner, Joe Franco, and Pat
Shin for helpful criticisms and suggestions. Copyright © 2011 by Jeffrey M.
Lipshaw.
1. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis:
Complexity, Causation, Law, and Judgment, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 299,
305–12 (2010). I am afraid that Professor Robert Miller of Villanova University may have made my point far more succinctly (and understandably) in a
short essay that was part of another symposium on the financial crisis in
which I participated:
There, I think, we touch on a strange truth about human nature. It is
deeply unnerving for us to think that, even when everyone is behaving rationally and honestly, the result can be catastrophe. . . . Such
events highlight the limits of the human condition; they remind us
how limited our cognitive and other powers really are. Hence, when
something terrible happens, it is much more emotionally satisfying
for us to identify a villain and hang him from a light post in the town
square. That way, justice is done, and order is restored to the universe. We achieve catharsis.
Robert T. Miller, Morals in a Market Bubble, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 113, 137
(2009).
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in two apocalyptically titled books published since February
20092), but the meaning we (including Judge Posner) as human
beings draw from natural and human-made catastrophes.3
When the world discombobulates our sense of order, our expectations of cause and effect, we seem either to (a) question our
most fundamental assumptions about science, progress, and social order, or (b) look for someone to blame.4
That is, in my view, a reflection of our long and difficult intellectual struggle with the extent to which order and regularity in nature and human affairs reflect purposes or ends. To
Aristotle, “final cause” constituted the purpose or ends (the te-

2. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE
CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009) [hereinafter POSNER,
FAILURE OF CAPITALISM]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST
DEMOCRACY (2010) [hereinafter POSNER, CRISIS]. I return to Judge Posner’s
assessment of the crisis later, as I ought, given that his scholarly work over
the last two years largely constitutes an affirmative answer to the question,
“did capitalism fail?” See infra notes 51–52, 127–32 and accompanying text.
3. For an alternative (and exhaustive) approach to the relationship between the objective study of markets and the meanings that events in the
market impart to participants, see generally Robin Paul Malloy, Framing the
Market: Representations of Meaning and Value in Law, Markets, and Culture,
51 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2003). Professor Malloy aptly captures the tensions between aspirations to scientific objectivity (what I discuss here as causation in
the atelic verb usage) in the analysis of economic events, on one hand, and the
subjective frames from which human observers interpret and accord significance to those events (tending to what I discuss here as causation in the telic
verb usage), on the other. Id. at 17–18. Our projects, I believe, are similar and
the approaches sympathetic. Professor Malloy employs Charles Sanders
Peirce’s work in semiotics, a study based on the concept that “humans are
sign-making and sign-interpreting beings. Signs, as such, include language as
spoken and written, visual images, colors, symbols, art, architecture, music,
and a variety of other ways in which ideas are communicated.” Id. at 14. I employ Steven Pinker’s recent work on meaning that we can observe in syntax,
semantics, and metaphor, themselves subsets of the signs within the broader
field of semiotics. See generally STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT:
LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO HUMAN NATURE (2007).
4. The reflections in this Article grow out of my interest in this last
point—namely, that a view of causation as the attribution of blame is central
to “thinking like a lawyer” as that concept has developed in Langdellian legal
science and legal philosophy. See generally H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORÉ,
CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959). Such a view is fine when the object of the lawyer’s activity is the attribution of blame or fault, the usual object of litigation,
but is a real problem in the exercise of judgment in other areas, like counseling, transactions, policy, and regulation.
For a sincere attempt to assess without demonization how various classes
of actors impacted the subprime crisis, see Claire A. Hill, Who Were the Villains in the Subprime Crisis, and Why It Matters, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS.
L.J. 323 (2010).
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los) “for the sake of which” things happen5—the characteristic
of nature that presents invariable sequences occurring not incidentally or by chance, but for a purpose.6 To Kant, there was no
a priori reason for assuming that nature, not an intelligent being, has purposes as humans have them.7 Instead it was part of
our nature, as minds observing the apparently orderly design of
the world, to analogize purposiveness in nature from subjective
human purposes (even though we nevertheless recognize proof
or disproof of such purposes in nature to be beyond the capability of human knowledge).8
Modern behavioral psychology has systematized our knowledge about the relationship between minds and the world, recognizing that basic hardwired “frames” cause us to interpret
data in light of ends or purposes. The noted behavioral psychologist Dan Ariely observed recently, for example, that multiple
credit card borrowers regularly pay off small balances even if
they are being charged higher rates on other cards with larger
balances.9 “We have this incredible desire to feel we are making
progress . . . . The satisfaction we get from fewer loans opened
overwhelms our decision of what is the right thing to do.”10
Steven Pinker has written extensively about the ways in
which language provides insight into, among other things, this
purposive aspect of human nature.11 In this Article, I apply
some of those insights to reactions to the financial crisis captured in sentences like “did capitalism fail?” The question itself,
in syntax and meaning (its semantic content), reveals our ambivalent relationship with telos. Pinker builds on the insight
that verb usage in our language incorporates fundamental human (rather than physical or scientific) concepts of causation.12
In other words, our language of causation is built on a human
scale, evolved out of and shaped by metaphors derived from
5. Aristotle on Causality, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 25, 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/.
6. ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS II, § 8 (W. Charlton trans., 1970). Thus, for example, animals grow teeth in regular patterns because such arrangements of
teeth are good for the purpose or end of promoting the animal’s survival. Id.
7. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 152–53 (J.H. Bernard
trans., MacMillan & Co. 2d ed. 1914) (1790).
8. Id.
9. Robert Langreth, The Empirical Economist, FORBES, May 10, 2010,
at 22, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0510/opinions-economics
-dan-ariely-pscyhology-ideas-opinions.html.
10. Id. at 22 (quoting Ariely).
11. E.g., PINKER, supra note 3.
12. Id. at 228–33.
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human experience, and has problems in dealing with the very
small (quantum) and the very big (or very collective). Some
verb usages convey atelic meaning (i.e., without imputed purposes or ends): things just happen without something purposively causing something. Some verb usages convey telic meaning (i.e., imputing purpose): the verb is telling us that the
subject of the sentence did something to the object, and implicitly the subject acted with purpose. When we use verbs conveying telic meaning in connection with a particular subject (like
something as abstract as “capitalism”), we are already suggesting the subject should be thought of as having purposes or
ends.13
I will proceed as follows. First, I will parse the question
“did capitalism fail?” to make it clear why I think it is ambivalent, syntactically, about the telos of the financial crisis.
Grammatically, is the sentence transitive or intransitive?
Second, I will tie the ambivalent syntax of the question to its
equally ambivalent meaning—telic or atelic—in connection
with the financial crisis itself. In the frame of the atelic metaphor, capitalism failed in the sense of getting sick or dying, and
the real problem was the perception that the professionals did
not know how to cure the patient. In the frame of the telic metaphor, a well-engineered modern society hums along smoothly,
operated and regulated by well-trained professionals. In that
case, either the machine or its operators failed our expectations. I conclude by suggesting that if we understand the source
of the metaphoric frames themselves, we may not solve the financial crisis, but we may be able to calm the troubled waters
of our fundamental assumptions and our concomitant desire to
find human or divine villains to blame.
I. PARSING THE QUESTION
A. THE SYNTAX OF “DID CAPITALISM FAIL?”
The first part of the argument deals with the ambivalent
syntax of the question “did capitalism fail?” Steven Pinker has
persuaded me that there is a relationship between parts of
speech—the place of nouns, verbs, subjects, objects, and predicates in language—and the fundamental concepts by which
human minds make sense of the world.14 Before getting to
13. See id. at 219–25; see also discussion infra Part I.
14. PINKER, supra note 3, at 24.
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Pinker’s insights, however, I need to be clear about the grammatical structure. The declarative construction of the question
is: “Capitalism did fail.” The subject of the sentence is the word
“capitalism.” The verb is the past tense of “to fail” supplemented by an auxiliary or helping verb “did,” which serves only
to set the tense more precisely.
Let us first clarify the semantic content of the subject of
the sentence, “capitalism.”15 In the context of this particular financial crisis, we are not talking about Adam Smith’s idealized
capitalism, “the free action of profit-seeking men bound together only by the market itself.”16 Nor is it the Marxian caricature
that “arises only when the owner of the means of production
and subsistence finds the free worker available, on the market,
as the seller of his own labour-power.”17 If anything “failed,” it
is our modern mixed capitalism in which the means of production are substantially in private hands but governments intervene to temper the effects of laissez-faire capitalism. Governments regulate markets in a variety of ways, such as setting
quality standards for meat, safety standards for automobiles
and airplanes, and fairness standards for the distribution of
and trading in securities. Governments actually create markets, such as establishing profit-making, publicly traded corporations like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that purchase residential home mortgages from “mortgage originators.”18 And,

15. Pinker analyzes nouns in terms of their relationship to our thoughts
about physical substance and more “vaporous entities,” but that analysis is not
directly relevant to my discussion here. Id. at 163–74.
16. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 35 (4th ed. 1972).
17. 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 274 (Ben Fowkes trans., Vintage Books
1977) (1867).
18. Fannie Mae, formerly known as the Federal National Mortgage Association, describes itself as follows:
Fannie Mae is a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) chartered by Congress with a mission to provide liquidity, stability and affordability to the U.S. housing and mortgage markets.
Fannie Mae operates in the U.S. secondary mortgage market. Rather than making home loans directly to consumers, we work with
mortgage bankers, brokers and other primary mortgage market partners to help ensure they have funds to lend to home buyers at affordable rates. We fund our mortgage investments primarily by issuing
debt securities in the domestic and international capital markets.
About Fannie Mae, FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=
home&c=aboutus (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).
Freddie Mac, “one of America’s biggest buyers of home mortgages, is a
stockholder-owned corporation chartered by Congress in 1970 to keep money
flowing to mortgage lenders in support of homeownership and rental housing.”
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perhaps not finally, governments modulate the macroeconomy,
either by a combination of spending and taxing, or by expanding or restricting the money supply. I have to believe, when we
panel members are asked the question “did capitalism fail?,” we
are no longer being asked about the capitalism of Vanderbilt,
Stanford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie, much less Smith and
Marx, but this mixed version that has evolved mainly since
1933.19
So much for the subject of the sentence. Now we need to
discuss the verb. There is an interesting syntactical ambiguity,
and how we come out on the syntax likely impacts the semantic
import of the sentence. The word play of my title highlights the
issue: Is the verb “fail” intransitive or transitive? Recall elementary English grammar. A transitive verb requires a direct
object. The syntax tells us X is doing something to Y. “Jeff blew
his nose.” “Suzy sold seashells.” “Suzy sold” is a strange sounding sentence because the transitive verb usage requires an object of Suzy’s action: something she sold. An intransitive verb
appears without a direct object. “Joe slept.” “Mary died.” Indeed, if we use what is normally an intransitive verb in a transitive way, we either get something that sounds nonsensical,
like “Mary died Joe” (instead of the transitive “killed”), or
something that we accept as emphasizing the action, as in “the
baby slept the night” (here we have truncated the adverbial
phrase “through the night” into syntax that sounds like the baby actually did something to the night).
What about the word “fail”? The dictionary gives both intransitive and transitive usages.20 As an intransitive verb,
“fail” means to fade or die away, to stop functioning, or to be or
become absent or inadequate.21 What is the significance of the
intransitive verb? The syntax means that we think of capitalism failing as something that simply happens, as in:
About Freddie Mac, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/about_
freddie.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).
19. Judge Posner, as usual, has a clear explanation of the term:
[C]apitalism is not a synonym for free markets. It is the name given
to a complex system with many moving parts. The buying and selling
and borrowing and other activities carried on in private markets are
only some of those moving parts. Others include a system of laws for
protecting private property and facilitating transactions, institutions
for enforcing those laws, and regulations designed to align private incentives with the goal of achieving widespread prosperity.
POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 1–2.
20. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 449 (11th ed. 2003).
21. Id.
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(1) “Life evolved.”
(2) “The universe expanded.”
(3) “Climate changed.”
(4) “Johnny grew.”
(5) “Obama won.”
(6) “Eliot Spitzer imploded.”
(7) “Capitalism failed.”22

If we ask the question “did capitalism fail?” intransitively, we
are asking whether it got sick or died.
The verb “fail” also has a transitive usage. Here, “fail”
means to disappoint the expectations of someone or something
(“Joe failed Mary in her time of need”), or to miss performing
an expected service or function for someone (“My legal education failed me in my search for a job”).23 If we ask the question
transitively, we are asking whether capitalism disappointed us,
blew the test, failed our expectations.24
Now we can proceed to Pinker’s insights.
B. THE SEMANTICS OF “DID CAPITALISM FAIL?”: AGONIST OR
ANTAGONIST IN THE FORCE DYNAMICS MATRIX?
Pinker’s contention is that language of causation reveals a
human proclivity to import purposiveness and intentionality
into causation.25 This is so even when we would immediately
agree with the proposition that nature has no such human-like
intention. Consider these sentences that employ transitive verb
usages: “Nature abhors a vacuum.” “The system seeks equilibrium.” We (or I at least) do not believe nature abhors vacuums
the way I abhor hearing iPod music coming from the headphones of the person sitting next to me on the subway. Nor do I
believe a system is seeking equilibrium in the same way I am
22. These are examples of nonpurposive intransitive usages. There can,
however, be purposive intransitive usages where the subjects are volitional
agents, like “Mary jumped” or “Plato philosophized,” but as discussed infra
note 46, my concern here is the possibility that our language permits attribution of purpose and intention to events not initiated by a volitional agent.
23. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 449.
24. It may seem odd to think of “capitalism” as a subject that is capable of
failing a test, but that is semantic and not syntactical. There are verb constructions that make perfect sense in which capitalism is the subject and does
something to someone: “Capitalism gave us one hundred years of prosperity.”
In this sentence, “capitalism” is the subject, “one hundred years of prosperity”
is the direct object, and “us” is the indirect object.
25. PINKER, supra note 3, at 153–63.
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seeking peace and quiet or my dog is seeking a comfortable position on the sofa.
Thus Pinker attempts to reconcile the syntax and semantics of intentionality in causation (what he calls the “oomph” of
our causal intuitions) with the more deterministic and scientific
concepts of causation.26 Two common philosophical propositions
about causation, for example, are constant conjunction and
counterfactuals. Hume’s view was the classic statement of the
first proposition.27 There is no “metaphysical” causation: what
we see as “cause and effect” is merely an expectation based on
the constant repeated conjunction of events. There is no necessary reason the billiard ball moves in a certain direction after
being struck; it just always does, and we expect it always will.
In the counterfactual conception, “A caused B” means B would
not have happened but for the occurrence of A. The problem
Pinker points out is that we do not experience counterfactual
worlds, and they can be anything; counterfactual causation
taken to its logical extreme counts too much as causation.28
An example might involve a Type I diabetic diagnosed in
childhood who, as an adult, commits a murder. Frederick Banting and Charles Best first isolated insulin and purified it for
use in the treatment of Type I diabetes, which until then was a
terminal disease.29 Under counterfactual causation, this discovery (A) caused the murder (B) because the murder would not
have happened but for the discovery of insulin (the murderer
would have died in childhood). Pinker thus notes a moderating
amendment to the counterfactual theory: we make sense of
counterfactual causation by only invoking possible worlds that
are “close” to our own.30 Indeed, that is what we do when we
control the variables in an experiment to determine causation
rather than mere correlation.31
Causation in the natural and social sciences remains the
subject of philosophical debate. Pinker’s approach is slightly
different. He contends language reveals, if not an answer to the
philosophical conundrum, then at least an insight into human

26. Id. at 218.
27. Id. at 157.
28. Id. at 211–15.
29. Lilly History, ELI LILLY & CO., http://www.lilly.com/about/history/ (last
visited Apr. 9, 2011).
30. See PINKER, supra note 3, at 213.
31. Id.
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intuitions about causation.32 I want to explore that insight in
the context of the question “did capitalism fail?” Put otherwise,
I find ridiculous the following proposition about nature: “The
earthquake punished Haiti because its people practiced voodoo.” The syntax and the semantics here are starkly consistent
with a meaning that the earthquake (or God) actually had a
human-like intention, and I reject it. I am far less troubled syntactically or semantically by this: “When the levee broke, the
floodwaters in New Orleans sought the level of Lake Pontchartrain.” The syntax suggests intentionality on the part of the
water, but I do not, when I think about it, actually believe the
water had a mind. But when somebody says to me not “capitalism died” but “capitalism failed us,” I do wonder about the relationship of syntax and meaning. That is, causation in the natural world and human views of causation are different, but they
are nevertheless inextricably linked, particularly when we are
talking not about a discrete, observable physical system, but a
conceptual scheme (like “capitalism” or “academia”) that is the
creation of the observers themselves.33
Pinker begins with the word usages that convey the meaning of causation: verbs.34 Verbs express the state of something,
whether something, namely the subject, exists, acts, or occurs.35 Verbs like “bring,” “make,” “cause,” and “force” express a
kind of pure causation. The subject acts on the object, as in “the
earthquake caused the tsunami.” Other verbs express causation but their meanings import a particular kind of effect, as in
“the wind dried the sheets” or “Fred shook his fist.” Other verbs
express concepts like prevention, as in “the glare impaired my
vision.” Some verbs express enabling, as in “Mary helped me.”36
32. The legal analog to the moderating amendment in counterfactual causation is “but for” causation versus “proximate” causation. See HART &
HONORÉ, supra note 4, at 95–96. In my view, this is simply a subset of Pinker’s broader point: language reveals a human intuition about causation and,
not surprisingly, law’s language does so as well.
33. See Stephen P. Turner & Paul A. Roth, Ghosts and the Machine: Issues of Agency, Rationality, and Scientific Methodology in Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1, 11–13 (Stephen P. Turner & Paul A. Roth eds., 2003).
34. PINKER, supra note 3, at 25–87.
35. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 1389
(“[A verb is] a word that characteristically is the grammatical center of a predicate and expresses an act, occurrence, or mode of being . . . .”). A predicate is
“the part of a sentence or clause that expresses what is said of the subject and
that usually consists of a verb with or without objects, complements, or adverbial modifiers.” Id. at 978.
36. PINKER, supra note 3, at 219.
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The primary insight on the human intuition about causation comes from an application of the linguist Len Talmy’s
“force dynamics” matrix to those verbs.37 According to Talmy
(by way of Pinker), most of the world’s languages capture causal intuitions by way of a pattern involving the relationship of
agonists and antagonists.38 (We will return shortly to the question of whether “capitalism” is an agonist or an antagonist in
the sentence under discussion.) The agonist is an entity with an
intrinsic tendency to motion or rest.39 The antagonist is an entity that exerts a force on the agonist, usually counter to the
tendency of the agonist.40 The matrix distinguishes among verb
usages based on whether humans are inclined to see purposes
or ends in the relationship between agonist and antagonist being expressed by the verb that connects them.41
In atelic settings (i.e., those in which we do not intuit purpose or intention), the observer is “dropping in on a situation
that is already in progress.”42 What makes it atelic is that the
sentence means “W is occurring” rather than “Y does something
to Z.” In the sentence “W is occurring,” W is the agonist. Agonists, according to the Talmy matrix, have a tendency to move
or be at rest, and can be either moving or resting on account of
their relationship with an antagonist that was already present
when we dropped in to observe.43 The matrix thus gives us
these atelic possibilities, which are expressed in intransitive
verb usages:
Causation. When the agonist has a tendency to rest, but it moves on
account of the antagonist, we intuit causation, as in “the earth revolves around the sun because of the sun’s gravitational pull.” The
earth is W, the agonist. It would not move but for the pull of the sun,
the antagonist.
Prevention. When the agonist has a tendency to move, but it rests on
account of the antagonist, we intuit prevention, as in “the car stayed
parked on Nob Hill because the wheels hit the curb.” Now the car is

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 219–25.
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 220–21.
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W, the agonist. It would move, but for the resistance of the curb, the
antagonist.44

The intransitive usage (and atelic meaning) as in “capitalism got sick” or “capitalism died” comes naturally, at least to a
modern social scientific sensibility. “Capitalism” is an agonist.
It is a process, or a system, that simply moves. How or why it
moves may or may not be explicable (say, by virtue of the invisible hand of self-interest). In the Pinker-Talmy allusion, we
have simply dropped in to find it moving.45 Antagonists, like
regulators, may get in its way or not (for better or worse, depending on one’s political orientation), as the case may be.
Moreover, causation-inferring sentences in the atelic setting are entirely sensible without the inference of purposes or
ends in the form of human-like intentions. It may well be that
Smith thought there was a divine purpose underlying the invisible hand, or others see animism in the forces of nature, but we
are entirely capable of making sense of the intransitive construction of “capitalism did fail” without such purposiveness.46
The alternative force dynamics matrix is in a telic setting.
Here the agonist still has a tendency to move or to rest, but the
44. The other two possibilities in the matrix involve the concept of “despite.” The agonist either has a tendency to move or to rest and, in each case,
does so despite the opposition of the antagonist. An example of the first is “the
Omaha Beach invasion pushed forward despite fierce German resistance.” An
example of the second is “the goal posts stood despite the push of the crowd
against them.”
45. PINKER, supra note 3, at 220.
46. My colleague, Pat Shin, notes that there are intransitive but telic
usages like “Mary jumped” or “Plato philosophized.” I agree. While all verb
usages that are semantically atelic would seem to be intransitive grammatically,
there are intransitive verbs that convey purposiveness. Talmy addresses this
in his discussion of force dynamics. He contends that force dynamics are built
into language structure, and hence structure reasoning about causal concepts
across a broad range of fields, including the physical, social, and psychological
domains. 1 LEN TALMY, TOWARD A COGNITIVE SEMANTICS 410 (2000). As Talmy notes, he deliberately uses (as does Pinker) nonsentient examples, because
the inclusion of an agent in a sentence, though often yielding a syntactically simpler construction, actually involves an additional semantic
complex. An agent that intends the occurrence of a particular physical
event, say a vase’s breaking, is necessarily involved in initiating a
causal sequence leading to that event. The sequence must begin with
a volitional act by the agent to move certain parts or all of his body.
Id. at 421. The syntactical causal structures, in other words, are clearer when
the agonists and antagonists are not volitional agents. The point is to demonstrate how human language structures causal concepts even in the physical
domain, not to suggest that a human being cannot intend an action that might
be expressed by an intransitive verb.
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antagonist appears rather than having always been there (at
least to our observation), and the agonist either moves or rests
on account of its relationship with the newly appeared antagonist. In “Y does something to Z,” Z is the agonist and Y is the
antagonist. This matrix gives us telic possibilities, which are
expressed in transitive verb usages:
Causation. When the agonist has a tendency to rest, but it starts on
account of the antagonist, we intuit causation, as in “the limb’s falling
on it caused the windshield to break” or “the dog jumping on it made
the chair collapse.” The windshield or the chair is Z, the agonist. The
subject doing something to Z is the limb or the dog—in other words,
Y, the antagonist.
Prevention. When the agonist has a tendency to move, but it stops on
account of the antagonist, we intuit prevention or blocking, as in “the
pain in her knees made the marathoner stop at mile twenty-two.”
Here the marathoner is Z, the agonist. The pain in her knees is Y, the
antagonist.

Pinker observes that telic meanings in these transitive
verb constructions are “awkward” because they are meant to
demonstrate the relationship of events to events.47 In the first
example, the limb did not just happen to fall; something must
have acted on it. Pinker notes, however, that “everyday language glosses over this. An autonomous force, like the wind,
waves, or fire, or a person exerting free will, appears as the
subject of a predicate, and the predicate expresses the final
event in the causal chain, with the intervening links left unspoken.”48 Hence the sentence about the limb is particularly
stilted; the one about the dog less so; and the dog sentence
would be even more natural if it said, “the dog collapsed the
chair.” This, as Pinker observes, is because causal language can
be compressed: “[W]hen an antagonist acts directly on the
agonist, the act and effect [are both expressed in the ‘causation
47. PINKER, supra note 3, at 221.
48. Id. As in the atelic matrix, the telic matrix has two other possibilities,
but these involve the concept of “permit.” When the agonist has a tendency to
rest, and stops even in the face of the antagonist, we intuit “permit,” as in
“Mom’s quieting the dogs let her son sleep.” Son is Z, the agonist. Mom’s action
is Y, the antagonist. Son was going to keep sleeping, and Mom’s action permitted that to continue. When the agonist has a tendency to move, and starts
even in the face of the antagonist, we intuit “permit,” as in “the failure of the
levee let the lake flood the city.” The water is Z, the agonist; it wants to find a
certain level. The event constituting the failure of the levee is the antagonist,
Y; the occurrence of the event permitted the water to do what it “wanted.”
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plus effect’ verb described above].”49 Moreover, in the prototype
of causal verbs, “language’s most concise causative construction,” the antagonist “directly and intentionally caus[es] a passive agonist to change from its intrinsic state.”50
The transitive grammatical construction (and telic meaning) of “capitalism did fail,” as in “capitalism failed us,” or “capitalism failed our expectations,” seems to me to be more troubling because now we or our expectations are agonists, and
capitalism is the antagonist that did something (or not) to us. I
could propose variations on this theme:
“In the state of nature we were happy, and capitalism made us unhappy.”
“Under laissez-faire capitalism, we were happy, but mixed capitalism
made us unhappy.”
“Mixed capitalism of the kind in place until George Bush got his
hands on it made us happy, but deregulation and a return to laissez-

49. Id.
50. Id. I need to be clear that Pinker substantially abridges Talmy’s exceedingly complex work, which proposes at length generalizations about the
way grammar reflects force dynamics (Chapter 7, “Force Dynamics in Language and Cognition”), and the semantics of causative sentences (Chapter 8,
“The Semantics of Causation”). TALMY, supra note 46, at 409–549. I have
simply tried to inform this panel’s topic with Pinker’s insights on Talmy’s
treatment of the intersection of syntax, semantics, and causation. Talmy’s actual classification of causative relationships in human language involves,
among other things, distinctions between volitional or nonvolitional subjects,
alternative transitive or intransitive verb usages, alternative syntax involving
stress on agonists and antagonists, and the role of the meanings of the nouns
and verbs involved.
For example, Pat Shin and I had an extended discussion of the sentence
“Mary hears a birdsong.” Pat thought that this might be a transitive sentence
with an atelic meaning. My reaction was that this might be akin to the force
dynamic of a sentence like “the earth basked in the sun’s rays.” Those could be
restated as “the bird’s singing caused Mary to hear it” or “the sun’s rays
caused the earth to bask.” Those would be atelic situations, with the song or
the rays as agonists (i.e., songs and rays have a tendency to move) and people
and planets, respectively, as antagonists (they impede the movement of the
songs and rays). We simply drop in to observe this all happening.
Talmy has an extended discussion in Chapter 8 of this kind of relationship
and would answer Pat’s concern this way. Talmy would refer to Mary as an
“Undergoer” and the sentence as one not really reflecting a causative relationship:
While an Undergoer . . . does not intend the event mentioned, she also
has not undertaken actions that culminate in the event. . . . In other
words, it impinges on the personal state—that is, affects the subjective state—of a sentient entity. Although the construction involved is
considered here because of its look-alike mistakability, it is not really
interpreted as a causative at all.
Id. at 517.
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faire unleashed Wall Street’s greed, and ended up making us unhappy.”

If this seems like a stretch, note that by early 2009 Judge
Posner had already published The Failure of Capitalism,51 and
a year later in The Crisis of Capitalist Democracy, he noted
that the “title alarmed some readers, who thought I meant that
capitalism has failed us and we need something different.”52
The point here is that the discussion, both in the symposium and in public discourse generally, is ambivalently atelic
and telic, with different entities, some volitional beings and
some not—us, the economic system known as capitalism, Wall
Street, the Federal Reserve, mortgage originators, Fannie Mae,
and so on—sometimes playing the role of agonist and sometimes antagonist. That it was not really capitalism that failed
us (instead it was many of the actors within the system) was
Judge Posner’s point even in the first book, though his readers’
reaction to the title was some evidence of the proposition that
the verb “fail” in this context is indeed transitive. Our first inclination may be that we could not possibly believe that capitalism is an antagonist with purposive and rational intentions,
and thus capable of being the subject in a sentence with telic
meaning, even if the sentence is transitive like “capitalism
harmed us.” Despite our progress, I suggest, we are not always
that modern. Instead, we are still ambivalent about purposes in
nature and human affairs, and in times of crisis, we hearken
back to a more satisfying telos, one that finds intentionality in
humans, gods, or demons.
C. USAGE AND MEANING SUMMARIZED
I summarize this comparison of transitive versus intransitive usage, as well as telic versus atelic meaning, in Figure 1.
Above the line is a series of intransitive sentences, beginning
with “Capitalism failed,” whose meanings are increasingly atelic. Below the line is a series of transitive sentences, beginning
with “Capitalism failed us,” whose meanings are increasingly
telic. Part II addresses two issues. First, is there something to
the idea that the intransitive usage in “Capitalism failed”
evokes the metaphor of “Grandmother weakened,” on one hand
and that the transitive usage in “Capitalism failed us” evokes
the metaphor of “Father ruined us.” Second, if so, what is the
implication?
51. POSNER, FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 2.
52. POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 1.
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II. THE TELOS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
In this Part, I tie the verb usages addressed in Part I to the
interaction of physical and human nature that reveals itself in
the imputation of telos to both. In other words, the structure of
our language of causation is intricately bound up with our concepts of causation, the semantic content of the proposition. I
think the financial crisis is as much about the transitive usage
(what the system failed to do as against our expectations) as it
is about the intransitive usage (a system either dying and or
needing emergency life support). The ambiguous meaning, either telic or atelic or both, is an insight into the aspect of human nature that resists purposelessness, even in abstract social systems like capitalism. In short, the question “did
capitalism fail?” invokes explanatory metaphors that may not
fail, but on the other hand, may have deserved no more than a
C grade. A better insight into human nature may lie in the
complexity of our language and thought that permits the
grammatical and semantic ambiguity of the question. While we
aspire to science, we are not beyond invoking gods and demons,
whether human or divine (and not beyond hoping for a deus ex
machina to rescue us).
My argument in this section proceeds in four parts. First, I
adopt, for purposes of this Article, a still controversial and debated view of metaphor as “not simply an ornamental aspect of
language, but a fundamental scheme by which people conceptualize the world and their own activities.”53 How we see cause
and effect is a matter of the framing metaphor we employ in
the analysis.
53. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., Metaphor and Thought: The State of the Art,
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 3, 3 (Raymond W.
Gibbs, Jr. ed., 2008).
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Second, the atelic meaning of “capitalism failed,” while
consistent with modern notions of purposelessness in nature,
nevertheless evokes an implicit metaphor about human limitations in the face of natural catastrophe. I recall my father describing my grandmother’s physical condition near the end of
her life as “she is failing.” In this usage, “failing” equals “dying,” as in “capitalism is dying” and we seem to have been incapable of preventing it, or “capitalism got sick” and we seem to
have not known how to cure it. The metaphor is to other catastrophic forces, like earthquakes or tsunamis or asteroids on a
collision course with the earth. In our modernity, we have come
to terms with many atelic realities, at least in the abstract or
long term: the sun rises and sets, seasons pass, we grow old
and die, and the sun will turn into a red giant and envelope the
earth in billions of years. But even though we are modern
enough to know not to blame the asteroid for what it is going to
do, many of us, nevertheless, try to reconcile its purposelessness with our own desire for meaning (purpose), particularly in
desperate times.
Third, uncovering the implicit metaphor of the verb construction “capitalism failed us” takes a little more work. One
approach is to find real human purposiveness to which we
might attribute blame. The other is to understand the persistence of teleology even in sophisticated social science; the result
of which “capitalism failed us” becomes a metaphor for the machine and its operators who failed to do their respective jobs.
Finally, asking the question “did capitalism fail?” provides
an opportunity to reflect on the metaphors it evokes, and to discard the ones that are not constructive.
A. METAPHOR THEORY APPLIED TO CAUSATION
The claim that metaphors have semantic content (i.e., real
meaning) is not without controversy. Pinker’s assessment of
metaphor is sensible. He rejects both of the polar positions.54
Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty famously asserted that
metaphors carry no meaning beyond the literal statement.55 On
this account, language divides into semantics, which is meaning, and pragmatics, which are the flourishes and filigrees by
which speakers draw attention to their literal utterances. Thus,
54. PINKER, supra note 3, at 235–78.
55. See generally RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY
(1989); Donald Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, 5 CRITICAL INQUIRY 31
(1978).
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Romeo’s statement “Juliet is the sun” does not really convey
meaning about Juliet, but “is like using italics, or illustrations,
or odd punctuation or formats.”56 At the other extreme, George
Lakoff and Mark Johnson assert that all thought derives from
metaphors that our brains developed from the fact of their being embodied in human beings.57 On this account, there are no
transcendent or universal concepts, nor is there any truly abstract reasoning; instead, minds, reason, and thought are
“shaped crucially by the peculiarities of our human bodies, by
the remarkable details of the neural structure of our brains,
and by the specifics of our everyday functioning in the world.”58
Pinker calls the Davidson-Rorty position the “killjoy
theory” of metaphor, and I agree.59 It is true that some metaphors are dead, in the sense that we use them with absolutely
no recognition of the fact that they are metaphors. (Pinker’s example is the phrase “coming to a head” which alludes to the accumulation of pus in a pimple.)60 But all metaphors were once
new and fresh, and some continue to be. Moreover, metaphors
are a fundamental source of learning and understanding: they
are “tools of inference that can be carried over from the physical
to the nonphysical realms, where they can do real work.”61 Metaphor in science is a “way of adapting language to reality, not
the other way around, and . . . it can capture genuine laws in
the world, not just project comfortable images onto it.”62
56. RORTY, supra note 55, at 18; see also Davidson, supra note 55, at 31–
32. For a summary of the deflationary accounts of metaphor and a response,
see Mark Johnson, Philosophy’s Debt to Metaphor, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF METAPHOR AND THOUGHT, supra note 53, at 39, 39–52.
57. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE
EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 4 (1999).
58. Id. For a summary of Lakoff ’s updated neural theory of language,
which postdates his work with Johnson, see George Lakoff, The Neural Theory
of Metaphor, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF METAPHOR AND THOUGHT, supra note 53, at 17, 17–38.
59. PINKER, supra note 3, at 238–41.
60. Id. at 238; see also Susan Haack, The Growth of Meaning and the Limits of Formalism: In Science, In Law, 29 ANÁLISIS FILISÓFICO 5, 6 (2009) (discussing the life cycle of metaphors as part of the process by which “organic,
living” languages “shift, change, and adapt”).
61. PINKER, supra note 3, at 252.
62. Id. at 259; see also Haack, supra note 60, at 11–18. I do not suggest
that Professor Haack supports any variation of the metaphor theory. She
simply rejects the twentieth-century commonplace view that “what makes
science rational must be explicable exclusively in narrowly logical, i.e., formal,
syntactically characterizable, terms.” Id. at 12. Instead, science progresses by
way of hypotheses whose vocabulary links the syntax of the hypothetical language to the reality it seeks to describe:
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Metaphors may not be the end-all of human thought, but
they are indeed powerful in shaping how we approach new issues (like financial catastrophes). Says Pinker:
The human mind comes equipped with an ability to penetrate the
cladding of sensory appearance and discern the abstract construction
underneath—not always on demand, and not infallibly, but often
enough and insightfully enough to shape the human condition. Our
powers of analogy allow us to apply ancient neural structures to newfound subject matter, to discover hidden laws and systems in nature,
and not least, to amplify the expressive power of language itself.63

How might those powers of analogy actually work in the attribution of cause and effect? The metaphor theorists have something to add to the discussion, even if we, like Pinker, do not
accept all of their conclusions.64
The Lakoff-Johnson version of metaphor theory challenges
the traditional view of causation as unduly literal, objective,
and limited in time. Western philosophers alleged that causes
were either “literal entities or forces in the world” and had
something to do with the relationship of physical events, or
metaphysical forces that had something to do with the ability of
agents freely to initiate events in the physical world.65 Lakoff
and Johnson contend otherwise.66 Causation is not a literal
force in the world. Rather, causal terms are the result of comThis vocabulary-dependence is one reason why science cannot be understood in exclusively formal-logical terms—not that logic has no
role, but it is at most part of the story. It also suggests why scientists
constantly shift and adjust the language of their field, introducing
new terminology and/or subtly adapting the meaning of older terms:
they are working towards a vocabulary that better aligns with the
real kinds of thing or stuff.
Id. at 13 (footnotes omitted).
63. PINKER, supra note 3, at 276.
64. Pinker rejects what he calls Lakoff ’s messiah theory of metaphor. Id.
at 245–51. Pinker remains open to the possibility that there are transcendent
or universal truths that arise other than by metaphors of embodied physical
experience, and that ideas are something more than merely rival metaphoric
frames. Id. at 259. This is because “[c]onceptual metaphors can be learned and
used only if they are analyzed into more abstract elements like ‘cause,’ ‘goal,’
and ‘change,’ which make up the real currency of thought.” Id. This is consistent with Pinker’s view that there are indeed Kantian categories that precede
experience and that are “the mind’s supports for negotiating reality.” Id. at
158. I am wholly sympathetic with this latter view (i.e., my intuition is that
there are some universal and nonembodied concepts), but for purposes of this
Article, I only need to establish that metaphors, blending (the creation of new
meaning out of the integration of two apparently unrelated concepts), and rival frames matter, i.e., rejecting the killjoy position.
65. Johnson, supra note 56, at 40.
66. Id. at 39–52.
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plex mapping taking place within the human mind, applying
the experience of physical space or motion metaphorically to
create abstract connections between events. Moreover, there
are many schemata employed in such mappings, and thus
many metaphors for causation in science (or in ordinary experience).67 These schemata include fundamental physical events
like the change of the state of an object or movement down a
path.68
Thus, the very complexity and elusiveness of causation as
either physical fact or conceptual mapping, as well as the persistence of teleological purposiveness, even in physical science
(as discussed below), persuade me that metaphor theory helps
explain our minds’ ability to be at once scientifically dispassionate and morally blame seeking.69 It may simply depend on
which metaphor we are using to frame the particular physicalor social-science causation issue under review. The behavior
psychology pioneers Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman characterized a decision frame as “the decision-maker’s conception
of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice,”70 and proposed that decision frames are “controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by
the norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decisionmaker.”71 I see no reason why this phenomenon should not affect metaphoric or analogical thinking on causation, even in
science.
Here are examples of metaphoric framing in scientific inquiry and policy debates. One of my pastimes is to watch lectures on physics for nonscientists while I am exercising on the
elliptical machine. In one, Professor Steven Pollock of the University of Colorado, explaining particle physics, observed: “We
67. Id.
68. Id. Lakoff and Johnson claim to have mapped nearly twenty different
metaphors, and posit that several of them are used within different sciences.
Interestingly, the closest Johnson comes to a concession to Pinker’s Kantian
critique is the statement, “[t]here appears to be what we called a ‘literal skeleton’ shared by all causation concepts [NB: metaphors], namely that a cause is
a determining factor in a situation.” Id. at 43; see supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing Pinker’s Kantian critique).
69. Johnson, supra note 56, at 44 –46.
70. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
71. SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
69–70 (1993) (citing Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 70); see also Malloy,
supra note 3, at 20–25 (discussing how framing devices affect the exchange
process).
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can think of the universe as being made up of little teeny objects, almost like little billiard balls. . . . [S]ometimes it’s ok to
think of electrons as little billiard balls and sometimes it’s just
inappropriate.”72 Thinking about electrons as billiard balls
gives them a meaning by analogy to other things, and we base
our view of the coherence of the explanation (not its rightness
or wrongness) on how it compares to other explanations we already view as coherent.
Another example of framing comes from a scene in one of
my favorite books, Isaac Asimov’s Fantastic Voyage.73 A ship
and its crew are miniaturized so they can travel through a
man’s bloodstream and destroy a life-threatening blood clot
from the inside. One peril leads to another and they are traveling through a lymph node where they witness antibodies destroying a bacterium. Cora and Michaels are both scientists
witnessing the antibodies and have the following exchange:
Cora said excitedly, “You can see them cluster. How . . . how horrible.”
“Are you sorry for the bacteria, Cora?” said Michaels, smiling.
“No, but the antibodies seem so vicious, the way they pounce.”
Michaels said, “Don’t give them human emotions. They are only molecules moving blindly. Inter-atomic forces pull them against those portions of the wall which they fit and hold them there. It’s analogous to
the clank of a magnet against an iron bar. Would you say the magnet
attacks the iron viciously?”74

Finally, the recent contretemps over the involvement of
Goldman Sachs in structuring synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)75 is, in my view, a debate that hinged entirely
on the metaphoric frame. If you see Goldman as an adviser (as
it would be were this a merger or acquisition), you see its
statements and omissions in a wholly different light than if you
see Goldman as a bookie.76 In the Senate hearings, it was clear
72. Steven Pollock, Lecture Two, The Standard Model of Particle Physics,
in DVD: PARTICLE PHYSICS FOR NON-PHYSICISTS: A TOUR OF THE
MICROCOSMOS (The Teaching Company 2003).
73. ISAAC ASIMOV, FANTASTIC VOYAGE (1966).
74. Id. at 177.
75. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Unbundling the Bets, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 10736903 (describing Goldman
Sachs’s role in creating CDOs).
76. Goldman helped establish ABACUS, which created a “reference portfolio” that mimicked, but did not hold, real subprime debt obligation. Jeffrey
M. Lipshaw, Goldman as Bookie: Inspector Renault Assesses Synthetic CDOs,
LEGAL PROF. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_
profession/2010/04/goldman-as-bookie-shocked-shocked.html. My reaction was
that this was analogous to the activities of a bookie facilitating action for bettors with different assessments of the outcome, assuming that, like in Las Ve-
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that Senator Levin employed the former frame; Goldman’s executives and defenders took the latter frame.77 As one who also
saw Goldman’s activity as the metaphoric equivalent of operating a sports book, I noted at the time that the epigram on the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s complaint should have
been: “I’m shocked, shocked to find gambling is going on in
here!”78
If our concepts of causation can be metaphoric, with many
different sources for the explanatory mapping, there is no clear
cut-off between attributing purpose and intention where the action is related to human volition (structuring CDOs or regulating the money supply), on one side, and attributing purpose to
forces of nature (electrons and antibodies), on the other. If Cora, a scientist, could react to the antibodies by inferring purpose and viciousness, no wonder that people can find the same
in complex Wall Street gambling, whether or not the underlying metaphors and meanings are really warranted.
With that brief background in metaphoric framing as applied to causation, let us proceed to deal with the metaphors
possibly embedded in the question “did capitalism fail?”
B. THE ATELIC METAPHOR: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS WAS TO
CAPITALISM AS THE COMET IN DEEP IMPACT WAS TO EARTH
It is not remarkable for modern social scientists to ask the
question “did capitalism fail?” with an atelic meaning implicit
in the verb construction. As noted, we want to remove teleology
from scientific language, even if the teleology seems to persist.
Yet our veneer of dispassionate and atelic scientism crumbles
in the face of catastrophe.
Did capitalism fail? If not, it certainly quaked, but that was
not the real issue. We would naturally expect that deepwater
oil wells might break, but it would surprise us if the operators
of those wells seemed to have no clue how to fix the problem.
Similarly, we are used to even large businesses falling victim to
the creative destruction of capitalism,79 but this crisis was sysgas, bookmaking is legal. Id.; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, When Deals on
Wall Street Resemble a Casino Wager, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 8128042. Not everyone agrees with the metaphor.
77. Shahien Nasiripour, Goldman Sachs Hearings: Live Updates, Video,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27, 2010, 1:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/04/27/goldman-sachs-hearings-li_n_553318.html.
78. Lipshaw, supra note 76.
79. See POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 132–33 (arguing that while the
bankruptcies of General Motors and Chrysler might have been a short-term
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temic. What surprised us was not just that the subprime crisis
brought down Bear, Lehman, and AIG, but that it seemed to
have surprised the professionals to whom we, as a modern society, came to cede matters of scientific complexity, those requiring specialized expertise beyond mere common sense. If
otherwise thoughtful people believed that models and algorithms gave us the ability not only to understand complex financial markets but to control and even eliminate the risk of
economic disaster, then they were as mistaken as Enlightenment intellectuals who thought, after Newton, that understanding physics meant that we could control and even eliminate the risk of physical disaster like earthquakes. In other
words, this kind of crisis of knowledge has happened before,
and in a world that, to our present-day eyes, was far less complex than our own.
What made the financial crisis of 2008–2009 so shocking
was not just the tumbling of the markets and the freezing up of
credit. Instead, the crisis for many thoughtful people was as
much one of coming to terms with the limits of, or overconfidence about, how well financial market participants and regulators knew their business.80 Over the last hundred years or so,
we have put more and more of our lives and fortunes into the
hands of professionals, and relied on their specialized knowledge to keep us healthy (doctors), productive (information
technologists), safe (government regulators), and financially secure (brokers, investment advisers, insurance agents, etc). In a
nutshell, the epistemological crisis (rather than the financial
crisis) was a crisis in confidence when it turned out that an entire cadre of professionals—mortgage brokers, credit rating
agencies, investment bankers, fund managers, and financial
regulators—did not seem to know what they were supposed to
know about cause and effect in financial markets. Indeed, the
financial crisis was as much a “crisis of knowledge,” in which
most of us went from being blissfully ignorant (not knowing
what we did not know) about things like collateral debt obligations and credit default swaps to wondering about how we
could avoid this kind of bubble expansion and bursting in the
future (now knowing enough to worry but not enough to be able
to solve the problems).

shocker and there would have been significant dislocations, the failure would
not have had a significant long-term macroeconomic effect).
80. See Lipshaw, supra note 1, at 2–9.
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The professionals did not know what to do. In this context,
the atelic meaning of the question “did capitalism fail?” evokes
powerlessness and fear, in the sense that there are forces without purpose, merely random, like earthquakes and tsunamis,
which are indeed beyond our control. A piece of popular culture,
Mimi Leder’s film Deep Impact,81 explored precisely that powerlessness and fear by way of not-so-fanciful science fiction: a
comet is going to hit Earth, causing an extinction-level event,
and preventing the disaster is likely beyond the limits of human intervention. What I thought was particularly effective in
the film was that nothing worked, and we sink deeper and
deeper into hopelessness with each successive failure. First, it
turns out that the government has been aware of the problem,
and has outfitted a ship (the Messiah) and highly trained crew
to destroy the comet. Despite all the planning and training, a
drill bit gets stuck and cannot place the explosives at the correct depth. As a result, the blast simply breaks the comet into
two pieces, one of which is still big enough to wipe out all life.
The ensuing plan to save a core of humanity in deep caves
turns out to be a social disaster. Nevertheless, there is still
hope in a last attempt, as the comet closes in on Earth, to deflect it with a barrage of missiles. That too fails. Finally, President Morgan Freeman, now in a sweater rather than a suit,
announces that all life on Earth is to be wiped out with this coda: “So that’s it. Good luck to us all.” My reaction to the film
was that it likely understated the extent to which such an
event would strip away the veneer of modernity, and provoke
panic, desperation, violence, and insanity.
Have I overstated this? Probably. But the Dow sinking to
something close to 6000 was about as close as I have ever come
to thinking about my own personal extinction-level events. Few
readers of this Article, I suspect, would welcome the rejection of
economic, sociological, or other social scientific analysis of the
financial crisis in favor of the explanation historically invoked
to find purpose in what otherwise seems purposeless: “It was
God’s will.” We are rational enough not to blame the comet. But
when the experts who were supposed to have been able to predict things like comets hurtling toward us are at sea themselves, it does not take long for the telos to return in the form of
the purposiveness of gods and demons, whether human or divine.82
81. DEEP IMPACT (Paramount Pictures 1998).
82. CBS Moneywatch interviewed Peter L. Bernstein, one of the gurus of
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C. THE TELIC METAPHOR: CAPITALISM WAS TO PROSPERITY AS
THE ASSEMBLY LINE WAS TO PRODUCTIVITY
Did capitalism fail us? The transitive construction (and telic implication) is a little odd. It is hard to talk even about abstract social systems without invoking the language of purpose:
even to someone as ardently anti-metaphysical as Judge Posner, mixed capitalism (i.e., private incentives along with laws,
regulations, and institutions for enforcing them) has “the goal
of achieving widespread prosperity.”83 There are two ways to
approach the possibilities of telic meaning in the transitive
verb construction. The first is to find real human purpose. Even
if we are not prepared to ascribe the workings of the invisible
hand to the purposes of actual gods and demons, it is no great
leap to contend that those in charge of regulating financial
products and making markets in the modern form of capitalism
failed us.84 Judge Posner notes, “[I]f the regulatory framework
is defective, it must be changed, because competition will not
permit businessmen to subordinate profit maximization to concern for the welfare of society as a whole, and ethics can’t take
the place of regulation.”85
Who are “they” and what did they do wrong? When one is
participating in and regulating financial markets, professional
judgments are more like scientific judgments than legal judgments. They involve understanding social systems, being able
to propose predictive and testable hypotheses about how the
systems work, and the effects regulatory intervention would
cause. It is one thing to observe a physical system as an outsider; it is another to be a participant in the system and to say, for
example, as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, that this inflation in asset values is now a bubble and it is time to adminfinancial risk and uncertainty, in March 2009 and posed the question, “So
many experts steered us wrong. Who can we trust?” He answered:
I sure as hell don’t know. This is an experience that has no precedent,
so nobody is very smart on this occasion. I’m old enough to have lived
through the Depression. The Depression was caused by and magnified
by things entirely different. The Depression has very little to teach
us. We’re really flying blind.
Jeffrey Nash, Peter Bernstein: “Always Ask Yourself: What if I’m Wrong?,”
MONEYWATCH, Mar. 9, 2009, http://moneywatch.bnet.com/investing/article/peter
-bernstein--always-ask-what-if-im-wrong/277141/.
83. POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 2.
84. Miller, supra note 1, at 113 (“[Parceling out] moral blame to regulators,
Wall Street financiers, loan originators and securitizers, auditors, rating agencies, and consumers” is a pious-sounding story bearing little relation to reality).
85. POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 2.
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ister some corrective medicine. Once a catastrophe has occurred, the natural lawyerly impulse is to assign blame, because the retroactive assignment of blame, in the ordinary conception, is what lawyers do. I find that impulse unhelpful,
believing as I do that the crisis has been as much epistemological as financial. My answer to the epistemological aspect of the
crisis is to separate out the blame game of hindsight bias, confront what we know and do not know, decide what our goals are
(for example, if you hedge against busts, you give up a lot of the
fun on the ride up the bubble), and not fall victim to the faith
that algorithms rather than continuing application of good (not
perfect) judgment solve any of our problems.86
The other approach to the telic meaning of the question is
to understand the persistence of teleology in science. Even
when our scientific minds tell us there is no purpose, and the
universe is no more than a system operating deterministically
or probabilistically under the laws of classical and/or quantum
physics, the idea of a wholly atelic universe does not come easily. Shakespeare captured the ultimate animation of nature
when he wrote, “[A]s flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods.
They kill us for their sport.”87 It reflects the human unwillingness to accept that nature is truly either random or deterministic, but the insistence instead on the intentionality of the gods.
Even randomness in nature, the bad fortune that seems to befall us for no reason, has a reason, even if it is nothing more
than the gods deciding they have the purpose of playing games
of chance for their own entertainment.
Thus, the intellectual history of science has been in large
part the replacement of telic cause with atelic cause (the traditional view that Johnson criticized).88 Aristotle’s “final cause”
was the concept that change occurs, even in nature, “for the
sake of something.”89 When we perceive systems in nature, we
presume an order beyond mere chance, such that it does not
matter whether there really was a “designer,” because when
something works, it seems intuitive to be to an end or purpose,
like a house to shelter us, or our incisors and molars appropriate to tear and grind our food:
[W]hen an event takes place always or for the most part, it is not incidental or by chance . . . . It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not
86.
87.
88.
89.

See Lipshaw, supra note 1, at 312–34.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 4, sc. 1.
Johnson, supra note 56, at 40.
See Aristotle on Causality, supra note 5.

2011]

CAPITALISM AND METAPHORS

1557

present because we do not observe the agent deliberating. . . . It is
plain then that nature is a cause, a cause that operates for a purpose.90

The ultimate in atelic causation was Hume’s concept of
causation as the mere perception of constant conjunction,91 the
antithesis of the purposiveness called out by Shakespeare and
his character Gloucester.92 Even after the Enlightenment, as
secular philosophers and scientists came to view the processes
of nature as something wholly apart from moral desert, teleology persisted, particularly in the social sciences.93 It is simply
silly to think that the toilet ballcock system has human-like
ends or purposes to stop water flow, even if the function or purpose of the system is to do exactly that. As Professor Stephen
Turner observed, even in the context of social systems, unless
we are willing to accept a group mind or collective intelligence,
“end-seeking is a property that adds no explanatory content—
everything that happens does so because of the arrangement of
causal mechanisms such as the feedback mechanisms that do
the work of directing the system toward the end state.”94
But teleology still persists. Professor Turner asks, “To
what extent are [social institutions] ‘real,’ or, put differently, do
they possess any explanatory force beyond the elements of human action and physical causality that compose them?”95 His
speculations on the reasons for the persistence of teleology return, in a way, to Pinker’s (or the Lakoff and Johnson) thesis:
even attempts to state teleological terms in nonteleological language seem to fail. He cites Ernest Nagel’s attempt to restate
teleological statement <1> into purportedly nonteleological
statement <2>:
<1> “The function of the leucocytes in human blood is to defend the
body against foreign micro-organisms.”96

90. Aristotle, Physics, Book II, § 8, in THE PORTABLE GREEK READER 406,
428–29 (W.H. Auden ed., 1948).
91. Turner & Roth, supra note 33, at 12.
92. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 87.
93. See Stephen P. Turner, Cause, the Persistence of Teleology, and the
Origins of the Philosophy of Social Science, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 33, at 21, 30.
94. Id. at 35.
95. Id. at 34.
96. Id. at 36 (quoting ERNEST NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE:
PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 405 (1961)).
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<2> “Unless human blood contains a sufficient number of leucocytes,
certain normal activities of the body are impaired.”97

Victor Gourevitch’s response was that statement <2>, in its
use of sufficient, normal, and impaired, presupposed the function or purpose of a healthy blood system. Indeed, “the only real
difference between [the] two statements is that the so-called
nonteleological statement takes for granted what the teleological statement renders explicit.”98
Thus, the question “did capitalism fail?,” at least in the
transitive verb usage, implies that it has a purpose. One way to
deal with teleology is to be more specific about identifying
mechanisms, as in neoclassical economics, by understanding
that there is not really an “invisible hand,” but that the reference is a shorthand way of (or a useful metaphor in) aggregating individual actions into a systemic tendency to reach (or,
even more teleologically, seek) equilibrium.99 It is one thing to
ask if capitalism died or is dying (intransitively), and if so, figure out how to correct it. The danger of the persistence of teleology is when “other collective concepts used as explanations
seem to be wholly analogical and incapable of being broken
down into plausible mechanisms.”100
The problem lies in the framing metaphor that serves as
the persistent teleology: “Capitalism is a machine that serves to
make us prosperous.” If we liken capitalism to a human body
that had a stroke, and some of its metaphorical limbs were left
paralyzed, maybe there are some medicines we could prescribe
to restore the limbs to good use and some therapies we could
adopt to avoid future strokes. Sometimes that works and sometimes it does not. But if we liken capitalism to a machine designed (or whose function is) to produce prosperity, then it
must have broken for a reason we should be able to under-

97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Victor Gourevitch, Philosophy and Politics, II, 22 REV.
METAPHYSICS 281, 293 n.107 (1968)). Robert Miller has suggested to me that
there is more of a principled difference between the “purposes” of an agent and
the “functions” of a thing or system than I have credited here. See, e.g., Francis Slade, Ends and Purposes, in FINAL CAUSALITY IN NATURE AND HUMAN
AFFAIRS 83, 83–85 (Richard F. Hassing ed., 1997). To a large extent, the very
debate supports my point. Turner addresses this explicitly in the referenced
discussion: “Whether functional arguments avoid the traditional difficulties of
teleology is controversial.” Turner, supra note 93, at 35 (emphasis added).
99. Turner, supra note 93, at 38.
100. Id.
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stand, we should be able to fix it, and we should feel confident
that future breakages will not occur.
James Champy’s description of the business manager’s ordeal is a profound assessment of the operative metaphor of the
machine, and is equally applicable to the ordeal of the regulatory manager.101 Alfred Sloan envisioned and created “a management machine, a way to build not just cars, but an entire
company.”102 The metaphor had great appeal: the company was
a cruise ship that, correctly managed, “should operate with perfect reliability and rationality.”103 The problem was that the
metaphor, a product of the 1920s, lost its explanatory power in
the competitive seas of the 1980s and 1990s. Champy proposed
a different metaphor (while acknowledging the danger of using
any metaphor): managing a company was more like sailing a
boat “because there are so many factors—the wind, the tide,
the weather—sailors have no control or command over.”104
The metaphor of the machine feeds the persistence of what
we would have thought was benign teleology—that there is an
order in the physical and social worlds and so we are capable of
reducing explanation to a set of laws. The hubris of the financial engineers at AIG and elsewhere now blamed for the mess
and Judge Posner’s criticism of them, and the economists who
were supposed to understand their activities and the regulators
who were to limit them, are merely opposite sides of the same
coin.105 It turns out that there is no algorithm for an incessantly upward financial return (and if you see such a return over a
long period there must be something fishy going on). To be
sure, the great merit in identifying causal mechanisms for the
purpose of avoiding similar mistakes in the future is beyond
argument (though the pessimist in me believes that we will,
like the generals, be fighting the last war when the new crisis,
whatever it is, arrives). The problem is that any teleology of the
financial crisis seems to slip quickly from helpful explanatory
metaphor to the very real ascription of purposes to gods or demons.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

JAMES CHAMPY, REENGINEERING MANAGEMENT (1995).
Sloan was a founder of General Motors. Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 32.
See POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 339–52.

1560

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1532

D. TÖNNIES AND THE PERSISTENCE OF METAPHORIC
AMBIVALENCE
The question then is: Why such slippage? My thesis is that
questions like “did capitalism fail?” belong to a tradition of positing grand theories of the movement of history, and there is
not that much difference between the construction of explanatory metaphors as between science, on one hand, and gods or
demons, on the other.
One example of such a grand theory was Ferdinand
Tönnies’s attempt to reconcile traditional communities of belief
with the impersonal structures of modern life in his seminal
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Civil Society),
originally published in 1887 and updated through 1935.106 Gemeinschaft is the model of rural or village life, “based essentially on concord, on the fundamental harmony of wills, and is developed and cultivated by religion and custom.”107 Gesellschaft
is the model of modern urbanized institutions, “based on convention, on a convergence or pooling of rational desires; it is
guaranteed and protected by political legislation, while its policies and their ratification are derived from public opinion.”108
In Tönnies’s time, the equivalent question to “did capitalism
fail?” was “have modern social organizations of like capitalism
[Gesellschaft] left community [Gemeinschaft] in the dust?”109
Two things are significant about a look back at Tönnies.
First, it illustrates the influence of metaphoric frames, for better or worse, on grand sociological questions. If, as the metaphor theorists assert, the essence of thought is developing
meanings out of “mental constructions involving many spaces
and many mappings in elaborate integration networks,”110 it
comes as no surprise Tönnies can construct, and readers can interpret, a conceptualization of social organization that is at
once static and dynamic. For example, Fauconnier and Turner
demonstrate the complex meanings that can arise by way of
106. FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY app. at 247–61
(Jose Harris ed., Jose Harris & Margaret Hollis trans., 2001) (1887). Its English editor described it variously as “precocious immaturity,” “immensely ambitious,” and “steeped in erudition,” but “nevertheless frequently tortuous and
obscure in the exposition and knitting together of its central arguments.” Jose
Harris, General Introduction to COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra, at ix, xv.
107. TÖNNIES, supra note 106, app. at 247.
108. Harris, supra note 106, at ix, xv.
109. TÖNNIES, supra note 106, app. at 247.
110. Gilles Fauconnier & Mark Turner, Rethinking Metaphor, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF METAPHOR AND THOUGHT, supra note 53, at 53, 53.
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conceptual integration from the fundamental metaphor “time is
space:”111
<3> Three hours went by and then he had dinner.
<4> Minutes are quick but hours are slow.
<5> Those three hours went by slowly for me, but the same three
hours went by quickly for him.

This is not pure metaphor or analogy, but conceptual integration to create meaning. Statement <3> involves not only
projecting the order of space by units to time, but also making
those units into moving objects. But in space, units of measurement do not move. Moreover, if “time” as an object moves,
then its units ought to move at the same speed, but the allusion
in statement <4> suggests they do not. Statement <5> adds the
projection of a subjective perception of the moving objects such
that we are able to imagine “fast” hours and “slow” hours; that
is, even the individual units that move at the same speed may
appear not to do so.112
Tönnies’s dichotomies are steeped in metaphors and integrations far more complex than “time is space” or even “minutes flowed like hours.” While both presume peaceful communities, Tönnies’s metaphor for Gemeinschaft is “a living organism
in its own right”; Gesellschaft is a “mechanical aggregate and
artefact.”113 Moreover, there is a metaphor of movement: the
“entire development [of Gemeinschaft] involves progression toward market [Gesellschaft].”114 The essential debate about the
work has been the following: does it mean to say, as a historical
progression, urban society left village communities in the dust,
or is it an assessment of sociological archetypes that have always coexisted, albeit more or less at any given time? “Tönnies
was consistently to maintain that the dichotomies he had identified were not time-specific or mutually exclusive, and that
contrasting types of institution—and contrasting attributes
within a single institution—would always co-exist in any historical setting.”115
Nevertheless, it appears (legitimately, and readers have so
interpreted it) to be an assertion of the historical reality of un111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
See id. at 54 –55.
TÖNNIES, supra note 106, at 19.
Id. app. at 258.
Harris, supra note 106, at xxviii.
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ambiguous movement from one end to the other of the conceptual polarity.116 The traditional culture of community, or Gemeinschaft, “despite many outward trappings of continuity,”
was being “swept away by the rise of mass marketing, limited
liability, and large-scale business corporations,” or Gesellschaft.117 The lesson from this reading is that framing metaphors projecting from “time is space,” such as “history is a journey through time,” are so powerful that authors themselves
may either intend them or be unable to keep readers from inferring them. I simply do not know (nor, I suspect, do the organizers of the symposium) whether the underlying metaphor in
“did capitalism fail?” is atelic, as capitalism failing in the natural evolution of things, or telic, as in either the machine, the
gods, or the demons failed us.
There is, however, a second, more positive, point to take
from Tönnies. If we take him at his word, he is telling us we
were capable then, individually and as a society, of being simultaneously premodern and modern. I see no reason to think
that has changed in a mere hundred years. The metaphor of
gods and demons making history, on one hand, and the metaphor of capitalism as a fixable machine, on the other, each stem
from the same cognitive source and each is, in its own way, a
caricature. Fauconnier and Turner tell us that what might
seem to be a naïve projection of an invisible hand is, cognitively
speaking, a highly elaborate cognitive integration. “One standard conceptual technique is to project agency into the occurrence of events,” and the agents can be abstractions like time
as in “[t]ime marches on” or “[t]ime waits for no man.”118 And in
his criticism of the traditional philosophical view that causation is an objective fact of the physical universe rather than a
set of metaphoric mappings from the human experience of
physical relationships, Johnson observes that “there is no way
to avoid the use of one or another basic causal metaphor in
science,” as much as we might think good scientific explanations should not employ metaphor at all.119
The teleological metaphor is alternatively machines, gods,
or demons, and the latter two can be human or divine. The met116. Indeed, Emile Durkheim himself read the text not as an analytic
framework for understanding social organization, but as the description of a
“historical shift from a ‘solidarist’ past to a ‘mechanistic’ future.” Id. at xxix.
117. Id. at xiv.
118. Fauconnier & Turner, supra note 110, at 61–62.
119. Johnson, supra note 56, at 42.
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aphor of the machine is that capitalism is a system designed to
make us prosperous, and one that we can tinker with and perfect. The alternative metaphor is that we can lay the blame for
booms, bubbles, and busts at gods, demons, Wall Street bankers, or the Federal Reserve. Each seems to me as much a caricature of reality as the other. As much as we try to control uncertainty, some residual amount is, by the nature of things,
going to remain a mystery beyond our understanding. As Peter
Bernstein observed in his seminal book on risk, we try “to comprehend nature’s tendency to repeat itself, but only imperfectly.”120 He too links gods and machines, and their succession in
time as though Gemeinschaft yielding to Gesellschaft: “Those
who live only by the numbers may find that the computer has
simply replaced the oracles to whom people resorted in ancient
times for guidance in risk management and decisionmaking.”121 Even the most sophisticated decisionmaking models rely on a leap of faith: that in the relevant respect, the future will resemble the past. Bernstein turns to the novelist
G.K. Chesterton for the proposition that life “‘looks just a little
more mathematical and regular than it is; its exactitude is obvious, but its inexactitude is hidden; its wildness lies in
wait.’”122 And hindsight is always twenty-twenty: “After the
fact . . . the source of the wildness appears to be so obvious to
us that we have a hard time understanding how people on the
scene were oblivious to what lay in wait for them.”123
This is no appeal to quietism or inaction. Moreover, in the
course of taking action, there is great value in asking a question like “did capitalism fail?” If we cannot avoid metaphor in
the complex conceptual integrations that constitute our perceptions of causation, then we can at least be reflective about the
metaphors themselves. The great value of teleology in thinking
about the financial crisis is Bernstein’s more moderate view:
120. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF
RISK 329 (1998). Note that in 1998, Bernstein identified counterparty solvency
on financial derivatives as the key systemic risk and, in a poignant example of
uncertainty, cautioned against overregulating, noting that “there is only a fine
line between guaranteeing absolute safety and stifling the development of financial innovations that, properly handled, could reduce the volatility of corporate cash flows.” Id. at 325–28. For an interview with Bernstein after the
onset of the current crisis (and shortly before Bernstein passed away), see
Nash, supra note 82.
121. BERNSTEIN, supra note 120, at 336.
122. Id. at 331 (quoting GILBERT KEITH CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 148–
50 (1909)).
123. Id. at 334.
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even if cause and effect itself remains elusive, there is sufficient order and predictability in human affairs that abstract
social sciences like economics and concrete disciplines like insurance and risk management work. If we have a systemic disease, then we need to do the diagnostics and prescribe the appropriate regulatory medicine.124 I am no expert, but at least
some prescriptions about the kinds of systemic risk that provoke these questions come to mind: (a) either sweeping the
high-risk shadow banking system into banking regulation
(which seems unduly conservative because there ought to be a
place for such activity) or limiting the amount of leverage that
commercial banks may undertake by separating that activity
from more speculative banking (the point of Glass-Steagall);125
and (b) addressing the fact that systemic risk is not merely a
banking problem by providing for a liquidity lender of last
resort as proposed by Steven Schwarcz.126
Nevertheless, walking the line between the metaphors of
machines and demons is not easy, and commentators as astute
as Judge Posner can get a mediocre grade. Even though he correctly observes with Bernstein that risk is simply that aspect of
uncertainty we have come to systematize in a reliable way,127
nevertheless he seems unwilling to accept, with Bernstein, that
some part of the wildness will always wait. The metaphor of
the machine dies hard. Uncertainty by definition constitutes
the universe of those predictions for which there is no algorithm. Yet Judge Posner clings to the tautology that an algorithm or a function can somehow model (and therefore control)
the effect of uncertainty, expressing uncertainty aversion instead as a function of the time and cost it takes to gain infor124. Steven L. Schwarcz, perhaps the leading legal commentator on systemic risk, identifies the kind of event that induces questions like “did capitalism fail?”—widespread panic that induces systemic collapse. Steven L.
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 193 (2008). The ultimate goal of
law and regulation is to reduce the likelihood of such panic. This is, of course,
easier said than done. As Professor Schwarcz observes, “[a]ny regulation
aimed at preventing panics that trigger systemic risk, however, could fail to
anticipate all the causes of these panics.” Id. at 214 –16.
125. For an overview of this kind of reform, see POSNER, CRISIS, supra note
2, at 353–60. As to reducing leverage generally, see Schwarcz, supra note 124,
at 223–24. I note that Judge Posner and I share “disease metaphors” on this
point. POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 166.
126. Schwarcz, supra note 124, at 225–30, 241–43. Claire Hill also summarizes prudent regulatory moves that get at causes rather than the attribution
of blame. Hill, supra note 4, at 346–49.
127. POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 289–90.
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mation, and linking uncertainty aversion to liquidity preferences that are the proximate cause of systemic credit freezes.128
Alternatively, the metaphor of demons also dies hard, even
if Judge Posner’s well-taken point is that reform ought to be
“serious, neutral, [and] patient.”129 Judge Posner himself finds
no shortage of people and institutions at which we may point
fingers (the Federal Reserve Chairman, economists, credit rating agencies, and government-sponsored entities like Fannie
Mae). Judge Posner says that a realist view of human rationality “acknowledges the role of irreducible uncertainty in decision
making.”130 If so, even what appear in hindsight to be misjudgments by the regulators need to be opportunities for learning rather than opprobrium. I am afraid that the distinction between political and disinterested blaming (the kind Judge
Posner claims to provide) is far too subtle to overcome the demonic metaphor.131 Given my thesis about the attribution of
agency even to events that are not agents, it is not hard to see
how disinterested attribution of cause morphs into political
blaming. It is only a small move from “you caused this consequence” to “you are to blame for this consequence.” The former
is likely affected by hindsight bias, and the latter may be motivated by ideology, but both still have to do with finding fault.132
128. See id. at 295–96.
129. Id. at 362.
130. Id. at 31.
131. Id. at 250–51.
132. Judge Posner’s discussion of causation and hindsight bias highlights
the same difficulties of scientific or philosophical causation, on one hand, and
legal causation, on the other, that I discussed in Lipshaw, supra note 1, at
312–34. Judge Posner’s thesis is that experts like Alan Greenspan and Ben
Bernanke made errors in professional judgment—namely, in failing to anticipate consequences from extant conditions. POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 5.
Such are inductive judgments, common in science, that require the identification of a past regularity, the rule for which can be used as a hypothesis to predict future results.
Judge Posner is correct in stating that hindsight bias is an after-the-fact
confusion of actual with perceived probability, the event having actually occurred. Id. at 259. As a result of hindsight bias, people so affected “believe that
they, and others, should have been able to anticipate the event and they even
‘misremember their own predictions so as to exaggerate in hindsight what
they knew in foresight.’” Norbert Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct
Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 103, 112 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (quoting B.
Fischoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 428 (D. Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)). But the effect of hindsight bias
may not just be confusion; as Judge Posner puts it pithily, hindsight bias is “a
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CONCLUSION
I am wholly incapable of answering the question of whether capitalism failed. In this Article, I have instead probed the
syntax and semantics of the question itself to see if they provide insight into the meaning that modern and intelligent human beings draw from catastrophes like the financial crisis.
The question does indeed reflect ambivalence about purposes
and ends, the telos, in the physical and social worlds. Using
Pinker’s insights into language, I conclude that the verb construction of the question is ambiguous (being patently intransitive but latently transitive).
Moreover, each possible verb construction leads us to a different kind of explanatory metaphor about cause and effect in
the financial crisis. The intransitive verb construction evokes
an atelic metaphor in which capitalism is a machine that failed
(in the sense that it got sick) and simply needed to be fixed. The
lesson in that case is the fragility of the metaphor that appears
when it turned out that the doctors appeared not to know how
to cure the patient. The transitive verb construction evokes a
telic metaphor in which something or someone failed us, and
we need to blame an agency, whether it turns out to be human,
god, or demon.
Finally, asking questions like “did capitalism fail?” is indeed helpful if they cause us to question the metaphors. The
persistence of teleology and the metaphors by which we derive
meaning, it seems to me, are aspects of the human condition,
and neither good nor bad.133 They morph easily, however, into
the finger pointing not only of disinterested blame, but also of
potent source of unjust blame.” POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 196.
Thus, even disinterested hindsight bias is still bias and therefore suspect.
See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining
Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 90 (1995) (“[T]he possibility
that the hindsight bias may make precautions that seem reasonable in foresight look inadequate in hindsight.”); Susan J. Labine & Gary Labine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501,
504 –05 (1996) (“[T]he outcome . . . would significantly influence the decision
about the reasonableness of the . . . actions.”). I have no brief to defend Alan
Greenspan or Ben Bernanke, but Judge Posner’s book did not persuade me
that their decisions were blamably misguided or unreasonable as opposed to
being merely wrong in retrospect. Yet it is hard not to draw the conclusion
that Judge Posner finds their decisions culpable as measured by some standard of care, even if not a legal one.
133. Robert T. Miller notes in precisely this context: “[I]t takes a philosophical temperament to survey the limits of the human condition and nod at them
ironically.” Miller, supra note 1, at 137.
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political recrimination. My objective is not some unobtainable
dispassion, only a more reflective and measured assessment of
cause and effect.

